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The shield against bad character evidence provided by section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 
fits well with the modern concept of fair trial, and with other moves towards controlling inappropriate 
cross-examination. It has not resulted in the exclusion of defence evidence that has genuine value in 
relation to the credibility of prosecution witnesses, and if it has a flaw it is that it needs a specific 
mechanism to prevent distracting satellite litigation. 
 
In adversarial trial much emphasis is placed on cross-examination as a means of 
undermining a witness’s credibility. Traditionally, it was permissible to explore bad 
character, including previous convictions, in order to suggest to the jury that a witness 
was not “a credible person”.1 Section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 introduced a 
shield limiting the admissibility of such evidence, on the ground that the free rein 
previously allowed to advocates resulted in the admission of much prejudicial evidence.2 
Judicial interpretation of s.100 has accepted that the shield was necessary to eliminate 
the old, “anything goes”3 approach under which witnesses could face questioning that 
had no foundation beyond “kite-flying and innuendo”.4  
 
Section 100 applies only to non-defendants.5  The use of a defendant’s bad character is 
governed by s.101 of the Act, which on its face is more permissive in nature, and allows 
the prosecution to adduce evidence that could not previously have been received.6 The 
incongruity of s.100 being more restrictive than s.101 was flagged up in the early stages 
of the legislative process,7 but the government of the day stuck to its guns, leaving the 
courts to decide how to interpret both provisions in the interests of a fair trial.  
 
To complicate matters, a frequent focus of appeals under s.100 has been whether it is 
possible to contain the use of some forms of bad character evidence of non-defendants 
that would previously have been inadmissible. The issue typically arises where the 
defence makes an allegation of specific misconduct against a prosecution witnesses that 
has not been the subject of any proceedings, and the prosecution disputes its accuracy. 
At common law, the rule was (and still is, in matters not relating to bad character) that 
save in exceptional circumstances no evidence may be called to contradict a witness on a 
matter going merely to the collateral issue of his credit: the collateral finality rule.8 
 
*The author would like to thank Matt Thomason and Paul Roberts for help and 
comments, and the anonymous reviewer. 
1 Hobbs v Tinling [1929] 2KB 1. 
2 As recommended by the Law Commission, Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal 
Proceedings, Report No. 273 (2001) Part IX (hereafter Law Com 273). 
3 W [2014] EWCA Crim 545 at [23].  
4 Miller [2010] 2 Cr App R 19 [2010] EWCA Crim 1153 at [20]. 
5 Including, but not limited to, witnesses in the case. So for example an erstwhile co-
defendant is covered by the shield (as in Reid [2011] EWCA Crim 2162), as is the 
deceased victim of an alleged homicide (as in AB [2016] EWCA 1849).  
6 Section 101(1)(d). “[I]t is apparent that Parliament intended that evidence of bad 
character would be put before juries more frequently than had hitherto been the case.” 
Edwards [2006] 1 WLR 152. 
7 In the form of an objection to the more permissive nature of s.101: House of Commons 
Home Affairs Committee Report on the Criminal Justice Bill, Stationery Office (2002) at 
para 122.  
8 Hobbs v Tinling, above n.1; Harris v Tippett (1811) 2 Camp.637.  
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However this rule does not apply to evidence in support of allegations which, if true, fall 
within the statutory exceptions to the s.100 shield.9 Thus a judge may be faced with 
overseeing so-called satellite litigation to resolve the allegations against the witness, at 
the risk of distracting the jury from issues relating directly to the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant. This might suggest that s.100 has taken away one headache and 
replaced it with a worse one.  
 
 
The purpose of this article is to consider whether s.100 deserves its place in the bad 
character provisions, with particular reference to its impact on challenging the credibility 
of a prosecution witness,10 and what steps might be taken to alleviate the problems 
posed by satellite litigation.  
 
A brief history of the emergence of the s.100 shield  
 
Langbein asserts that the “two great initiatives” of judges in eighteenth-century criminal 
trials were to devise exclusionary rules of evidence directed at problematic types of 
proof, and to allow defence counsel to cross-examine prosecution witnesses.11 Before 
these developments, the character of the defendant and his accuser played a prominent 
role. Defendants with no access to legal representation and little advance knowledge of 
the facts that might be asserted against them could at least rely on their good reputation 
to demonstrate the unlikelihood that they had broken the law; and if the reputation of 
the accuser left something to be desired, this (in an age when complainants were 
essentially prosecutors12 and juries were able to tap into local knowledge about the 
parties) might well be enough to dispose of the charge. Conversely, a defendant whose 
character was bad could expect to be severely hampered by it. 13  
 
The emergence of defence cross-examination and exclusionary rules went hand in hand, 
as Hunter says, with the growth of a more defined notion of individual criminal 
responsibility and formal recognition of the presumption of innocence.14 A more 
sophisticated understanding of probability, and the practical need to present trials to 
jurors who, in a post-industrial society, could no longer draw on the resource of local 
knowledge also played their part in shaping the adversarial trial, including the 
restrictions on evidence of a defendant’s bad character.15    
 
It is not surprising, given the importance of defence counsel in shaping trials, that the 
arguments for protecting defendants took priority over any question whether prosecution 
 
9 Phillips [2012] 1 Cr App R 25. 
10 Section 100 applies equally to bad character evidence tendered to show the guilt of a 
non-defendant (see e.g Reid (above n.5); Jukes [2018] EWCA Crim 176) but its effect is 
more frequently felt in relation to challenges to credibility. Under s.101, by contrast, the 
majority of applications relate to evidence tendered to prove guilt, typically evidence of 
propensity: Research into the impact of bad character provisions on the courts, Ministry 
of Justice Research Series 5/09 (2009). 
11 J.H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003) p.178. 
12 J.M. Beattie, “Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English Criminal Trial in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries” (1991) 9(2) Law & History Review 221.  
13 Beattie (n.12 above) states that, while the factual evidence was a crucial concern, 
character was equally, or even more important.  
14 J. Hunter, “Character Evidence in the Criminal Trial” (2016) E & P 162; N.Lacey “The 
Resurgence of Character: Responsibility in the Context of Criminalization” in A. Duff  and 
S. Green (eds) Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law. Oxford: OUP 2011).  
15 “From early in the eighteenth century testimony about the accused having been an old 
offender and the like receded from Old Bailey trials, sparing the accused from the risk of 
prejudice inherent in such evidence.” Langbein, n.11 above at 202. 
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witnesses deserved similar consideration: indeed, the exposure of the self-interest of 
state informants had provided some of the most stunning examples of the value of 
cross-examination.16 By the middle of the twentieth century, the various exclusionary 
rules that had developed to protect the accused from prejudicial revelations about bad 
character could be summed up thus: 
 
“Subject to numerous exceptions, it is not permissible for the prosecution to 
adduce evidence showing or tending to show the bad character of the accused.”17 
 
At the same time, in relation to witnesses in the proceedings, it was said: 
 
“the bad character of a witness is admissible, on the ground that the statement 
on oath of a person of bad character should not be believed.”18 
 
In other words, the witness remained fair game but the accused, subject to exceptions, 
became a protected species. A witness’s convictions – the most common and easily 
established indicator of bad character and thus of a supposed lack of credibility - formed 
a statutory exception to the finality rule and, if not admitted, could be proved.19 The 
accused who chose to testify was shielded from such revelations, though the shield could 
be, and often was, thrown away where the defence involved imputations on the 
character of a prosecution witness.20 
 
At one level, asymmetry in the protection of the accused and the witness could be 
supported on the basis that the former was on trial and the latter was not, but if the 
foundation of the rule of exclusion was, as it was said to be, that bad character evidence 
might shed more heat than light,21 there was a strong argument in terms of probative 
value for a  mechanism to ensure that any doubt generated when a prosecution 
witness’s character was paraded before the jury was at least capable of being a 
reasonable one. In 1996 when the Law Commission raised the issue for consultation, the 
idea that advocates should no longer have free rein in attacking witnesses’ characters 
immediately gathered influential support.22    
 
The shift in perception was of a piece with other changes of the late twentieth century, 
recognising the importance of better treatment of witnesses both from the point of view 
of optimising the quality of their evidence 23 and preventing unnecessary distress.24 
Particularly influential in the gestation of s.100 was the strengthening of the shield first 
 
16 Beattie, n.12 above at 239, tracing the forensic triumphs of defence advocate William 
Garrow at the Old Bailey and including some spectacular revelations about the character 
of non-defendants. 
17 G.D. Nokes, An Introduction to Evidence (London; 4th ed 1967) at 142.  
18Ibid., at 138.  
19 Criminal Procedure Act 1865, s.6, which now takes effect subject to s.100. The 
perceived link between convictions and credibility was so strong that before the Evidence 
Act 1843 persons convicted of ‘infamous’ crimes could not testify, because no weight 
could be attached to what they had to say. See Christopher Allen, The Law of Evidence 
in Victorian England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997) at p.95.  
20 Criminal Evidence Act 1898, s.1(f), repealed by the CJA 2003 Sch. 36. 
21 Director of Public Prosecutions v Boardman [1975] AC 421at 454 per Lord Hailsham. 
22 Law Com 273 at 9.11 and 12, citing the views of Professors Jackson and McEwan. 
Professor Tapper, “Criminal Justice Act 2003: Part 3: Evidence of Bad Character” [2004] 
Crim LR 533 also agreed that the indiscriminate use of witnesses’ bad character could 
lead to “flawed outcomes”. 
23 The special measures provisions of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
(YJCEA) 1999 part II ch.1. 
24 See e.g. YJCEA 1999 s.34, preventing the cross-examination by the accused in person 
of a complainant in a sexual case. 
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introduced in 1976 to protect complainants in rape cases from unfair revelations about 
sexual history, which was not having the intended impact.25 When, in A,26 it transpired 
that the wording of the toughened rape shield required some reading down to avoid 
conflict with the principles of fair trial, the Law Commission’s response was to press 
ahead with the s.100 shield, subject to safeguards to ensure the right of the accused to 
a fair trial was never compromised.27  
 
Section 100: the shield and the exceptions 
 
Section 100 provides that evidence of the bad character of a non-defendant is admissible 
“if and only if” the party seeking to explore it either secures the agreement of all other 
parties to the proceedings,28 or obtains the leave of the court.29 Leave may be given if 
the evidence is explanatory,30 or if it has substantial probative value in relation to a 
matter in issue which is of substantial importance in relation to the case as a whole.31  
 
The option for the parties to agree bad character evidence might be thought a design 
flaw - there is no such feature in relation to sexual history evidence, and while it is 
symmetrical with the power to admit a defendant’s character by agreement under s.101, 
the witness’s interests are not represented in the same way. Legal guidance to 
prosecutors is clear, however: agreement should only be forthcoming “when one or both 
of the other gateways are satisfied or it is in the interests of justice to do so”.32 Although 
the reference to the interests of justice leaves room to manoeuvre, it is plainly not being 
suggested that prosecutors’ decisions should float free of the policy behind the gateways 
for which leave is required.33 If used appropriately, agreement saves time, and anecdotal 
evidence suggests it is well-used in practice.  
 
It is with the gateway providing for substantial probative value on a matter of substantial 
importance that we will be particularly concerned. Explanatory evidence, by its nature, is 
received not because it is part of the proof of matters in issue, but because some 
important aspect of the case would be “impossible or difficult to understand” without it.34 
It follows that a way must always be found to admit it.35  
 
To shield or not to shield?   
 
The primary argument for s.100, as put forward by the Law Commission, is that a 
witness’s bad character is of “little significance” if it bears on credibility only in the 
 
25 YJCEA s.41, replacing Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, s.2.  
26 [2002] 1 AC 45, [2001] UKHL 25. 
27 Law Com 273 at 9.36. 
28 S.100(1)(c). 
29 S.100(4). 
30 S.101(1)(a). 
31 S.101(1)(b). 
32 Bad Character Evidence Legal Guidance https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/bad-
character-evidence accessed June 2019.  
33 The same source states that s.100 exists “to protect witnesses and victims from wide-
ranging humiliating and irrelevant attacks on their credit; and ensures that clearly 
relevant evidence is admissible.” 
34 S.100(1)(a) and (2). The evidence must have substantial value for understanding the 
case as a whole.  
35 Explanatory evidence provides essential contextual information, for example where it 
is necessary to explain that a witness was a serving prisoner at a key time, as in Ivers 
[2007] EWCA 1773. It is likely that such evidence will be admitted by agreement. The 
gateway is sometimes wrongly invoked by advocates where there is no impediment to 
the jury’s understanding of the evidence or issues: see e.g. Edwards [2018] EWCA Crim 
424 at [25]. 
5 
 
general sense that bad people are more likely to tell lies, though it may be rendered 
more specific where it can be shown to afford a reason or motive to lie in the particular 
circumstances of the case.36 Where there is a risk that insignificant evidence might 
wrongly be elevated by the fact-finder to give rise to a reasonable doubt about the 
prosecution case, it should be excluded.  
 
The proposition is in line with the idea that fairness is a two-way street and that 
evidence can be described as prejudicial where it unfairly advantages the defence.37  
Even so, an argument might be pitched against an exclusionary rule if any rational 
inference might otherwise have been drawn: Stein argues against limiting the 
defendant’s right to mount a character attack on a witness precisely because “[t]here is 
a rational basis for considering such a witness possibly untrustworthy, which is exactly 
the claim that the defendant wants to make in order to raise a reasonable doubt. 
Silencing this claim is deeply problematic.”38 Of course, a claim is not necessarily 
silenced if it is filtered through an exclusionary rule, but the dynamics change 
significantly if the defence advocate, instead of having a right to adduce evidence of bad 
character, has to present a reasoned case for the evidence having genuine significance 
and probative value in the context of the case as a whole.     
 
It is argued here that the shift in dynamics is not only not problematic, it is symptomatic 
of a fundamental change of approach to the criminal trial in recent years. The quest to 
make trials more efficient without compromising on fairness has placed unprecedented 
emphasis on pre-trial disclosure, and the narrowing of the scope of issues to be 
considered at trial. The Criminal Procedure Rules39 and accompanying Practice 
Directions40 envisage that the defence no less than the prosecution takes responsibility 
for identifying the salient issues in advance of trial.41 The overriding objective 42 that 
cases be dealt with justly clearly reflects a transition towards a less partisan role for the 
defence in which not only are the rights of the accused to be respected, but also the 
interests of victims and witnesses.43 Both prosecution and defence can expect to be dealt 
with fairly, by the court, and by one another. The courts, for their own part, recognise 
that there is a tension between case management on the one hand and the rights of the 
parties (in particular the defendant) on the other,44 which the Rules and Directions seek 
to regulate.  
 
Before these developments, it was not uncommon for the adversarial trial to be 
described as a game in which the defence played a reactive role, probing the strength of 
the prosecution case and the credibility of its witnesses whilst keeping its powder dry. 
This model potentially legitimises wide-ranging character-challenge to prosecution 
 
36 Law Com 27 at 9.14. 
37 Ibid. at 9.16. Note the use of the similar expression “prejudicial to the overall fairness 
of the trial” in Criminal Practice Direction 22A.8 dealing with the case where a 
complainant’s sexual history is alluded to without the necessary formalities.   
38 Alex Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005) p. 
187.  
39 Criminal Procedure Rules (Crim PR) 2015, as amended. 
40[2015] EWCA Crim 1567, as amended.   
41 The duty of direct engagement of the parties at the first available opportunity was an 
overarching principle of the Leveson Review: Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings 
Judiciary of England & Wales (2017) https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/review-of-efficiency-in-criminal-proceedings-20151.pdf p.10 
(hereafter Leveson).  
42 Crim PR 1.1. 
43 CrimPR 1.1(2)(c) and (d) and 1.2, making it clear that all participants must conduct 
the case in accordance with the overriding objective.  
44 Valiati [2018] EWHC 2908 (Admin) at [2].  
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witnesses, even if it is of limited value. But the “underlying principle for criminal 
litigation in the 21st century”,45 categorically rejects the analogy: 
 
“A criminal trial is not a game under which a guilty defendant should be provided 
with a sporting chance. It is a search for truth in accordance with the twin 
principles that the prosecution must prove its case and that a defendant is not 
obliged to inculpate himself, the object being to convict the guilty and acquit the 
innocent. Requiring a defendant to indicate in advance what he disputes about 
the prosecution case offends neither of those principles.”46 
 
A similar direction of travel with regard to the role of the defence can be discerned 
across other jurisdictions. Jackson and Summers, for example, advance an attractive 
vision of a fair trial model emerging across both common law and civil legal traditions. It 
is based on the theory of “positive evidentiary rights around the notion of effective 
defence participation”.47 Defence advocates gain (positive) opportunities to challenge 
prosecution evidence at both trial and pre-trial stages, but in exchange, the right to 
some traditional (negative) means of challenge, which performed the same function less 
efficiently, are being eroded. One such right is the unfettered cross-examination of 
prosecution witnesses, particularly where this works against the effective presentation of 
their testimony.48 An important benefit said to be delivered by Jackson and Summers’ 
model is the “optimisation”49 of evidence on which a decision can be based. 
 
Admittedly, one important aspect of the optimisation model is the scaling back of crude 
exclusionary rules that work against rational evaluation by taking out relevant evidence. 
The s.100 shield appears at odds with this principle, but Jackson and Summers also 
accept that free proof may need to give way where evidence of bad character is 
concerned, whether because of rationalist concerns that undue weight that may be given 
to it, or because the rule represents a separate moral process value about the justice of 
deliberation.50 The question thus posed may be said to be whether s.100 impinges 
unduly on free proof.  
 
The optimisation model also provides a framework for critique of the Law Commission’s 
two subsidiary arguments for the shield, the first of which is that it protects witnesses 
from the humiliation of unnecessary revelations.51 On its face this argument seems to 
concern itself with the witness’s right to be treated humanely, though as humiliated 
witnesses are not likely to give their best evidence it also has implications for this 
discovery of truth. The second argument asserts that potential witnesses might be 
deterred from testifying at all if their past misconduct is considered fair game.52 The 
difficulty here lies in getting the balance right. The leading case of Doorson v 
Netherlands53asserts that States should organise their criminal proceedings in such a 
 
45 Ibid., at [15].  
46 Gleeson [2004] 1 Cr. App. R. 29 at 36, adopting the key principle of Auld LJ’s Report 
of the Criminal Courts Review (October 2001), Ch.10 para.154.  
47 John D. Jackson and Sarah J. Summers, The Internationalisation of Criminal 
Evidence:Beyond the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) p.367.  
48 Ibid., at p.375.  
49 Ibid., at p. 368.  
50 Ibid., at p.33. 
51 Law Com 273 at 9.20.  
52 Law Com 273 at 9.20. See also Hunter et al, Out of the Shadows: Victims’ and 
witnesses’ experiences of attending the Crown Court (Victim Support, 2018) 
https://www.victimsupport.org.uk/sites/default/files/Out%20of%20the%20shadows%
20report.pdf  for an account of witnesses’ appreciation of judicial intervention to 
prevent overly hostile or aggressive questioning. 
53 (1996) 22 EHRR 330 
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way that the protected interests of victims and witnesses are not “unjustifiably 
imperilled”, and that this may call for a balancing of their interests with those of the 
defence, but this does not much help to decide the point at which a witness’s interests 
justify the exclusion of relevant evidence. As Redmayne has argued in a different 
context, the defendant’s trial-related rights to challenge evidence are not self-evidently 
capable of being balanced against the witness’s rights to privacy and to be treated with 
dignity.54  
 
Accepting for the purposes of argument that the optimisation model represents not only 
the existing direction of travel in trials in this jurisdiction (which it would seem that it 
does) but also requires some remodelling of traditional defence rights (a matter on which 
a consensus is less likely, and to which I will return) the value of s.100 depends on 
whether it assists in the optimisation of evidence for decision-making; whether it 
promotes efficiency in terms of focus on the important issues, and whether it 
encapsulates the correct formula in terms of probative value for giving effect to the 
legitimate interests of witnesses without compromising the accused’s right to fair trial.  
 
The shield in operation 
 
(1) a matter of “substantial importance” 
 
After a somewhat uncertain start, in which the Court of Appeal was obliged on a number 
of occasions to clarify its scope, it was confirmed that s.100’s blanket ban on the 
evidence of a non-defendant’s bad character applies to cross-examination as well as to 
evidence adduced in chief, and that credibility is capable of being an “issue of substantial 
importance in the context of the case as a whole”.55 The observation of Kennedy LJ in 
Weir56 that there would be a “significant lacuna” in the legislation if it did not cover 
issues of credibility if anything understates the argument, given that unfair cross-
examination as to credibility was the primary issue for which the shield was designed, 
with evidence going to the issue of guilt being tacked on as something of an 
afterthought.57 As Hughes LJ pointed out in the leading case of Braithwaite, the 
legislative intention is put beyond doubt by the consequential amendment to s.6 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 1865 under which a witness’s convictions, previously freely 
available to the cross-examiner, can now be proved only where the witness is “lawfully 
questioned” about them: i.e. where s.100 permits.58  
 
Where a person’s credibility is questioned, and either he testifies or (which amounts to 
the same thing) the value of his hearsay statement falls to be assessed,59 the authorities 
accept that s.100 imposes a “significant hurdle”: “Just because a witness has convictions 
does not mean that the opposing party is entitled to attack that witness’s credibility”.60 
The argument that the prosecutor’s burden of proof renders every element of a crime a 
matter of substantial importance has been rightly rejected.61  
 
 
54 M. Redmayne, “Confronting Confrontation” in P. Roberts & J. Hunter (eds) Criminal 
Evidence and Human Rights (Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2013) 282 at 
p. 297.  
55 In particular Weir [2006] 1 WLR 1855, [2005] EWCA Crim 2866; Stephenson [2006] 
EWCA Crim 2325; V [2006] EWCA Crim 1901; S [2007] 1 WLR 63; S [2009] EWCA Crim 
2457; Braithwaite [2010] 2 Cr App R 18, [2010] EWCA Crim 1082; Brewster [2011] 1 
WLR 601. 
56 [2006] 1 WLR 1855, [2005] EWCA Crim 2866 at [73]. 
57 Law Com 273 at 9.2. 
58 [2010] 2 Cr App R 18, [2010] EWCA Crim 1082 at [12]. 
59 As in Harvey [2014] EWCA Crim 54. 
60 Brewster [2011] 1 WLR 601 at [23].  
61 Muhedeen 2016 EWCA Crim 1.  
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The strength of other evidence is often determinative of whether credibility, though 
technically an issue, has substantial importance. In Burchell62 B’s ex-partner, P, gave 
evidence that he had assaulted her. The defence was that P was unharmed when she left 
B’s flat, but an independent witness found her minutes later bleeding and in a distressed 
state. Bad character evidence relating to P’s credibility was held to have been rightly 
rejected on the basis that it did not bear on the issue in need of resolution, which was 
how she had come by the injuries in such a short space of time and in a public place if B 
had not inflicted them.63 
 
The question whether it is acceptable for the erstwhile right to challenge witnesses by 
character to be so “tightly restricted”64 in order to focus the fact-finder’s attention on the 
key issues to be determined raises a possible conflict with the right of the defence to 
challenge prosecution evidence enshrined in Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. As commentators have observed, however, if Article 6 conferred a 
right of equally intense challenge to every witness, it would be unworkable: “[i]t would 
be difficult to justify abandoning prosecutions simply on the basis of the accused’s lack 
of opportunity to question witnesses whose evidence is not important.”65 What ultimately 
matters is whether the evidence is at the heart of the case in terms of being the sole or 
decisive evidence, particularly where it is in the form of a deliberate accusation made as 
part of a formal process of investigation:  
   
“A focus on accusatorial statements to the authorities might then be a way of 
marking out a particular category of statement that is particularly outcome-
determinative and where the risks of the witness having an axe to grind are 
pronounced.”66      
 
 If the right to challenge prosecution evidence can itself be circumscribed in this way, it 
must follow that the right to challenge by means of a particular form of attack involving 
bad character evidence can also properly be limited.  
 
The more the veracity of the accuser’s statement is “outcome-determinative”, the more 
importance must be accorded to evidence suggesting that he is lying. Where a key issue 
is supported wholly or mainly by that witness’s evidence, and the cross-examiner aims 
to show that the witness is lying rather than mistaken, bad character evidence is likely to 
be admitted. In Docherty67 D was accused of making threats against C’s car, C’s wife, 
and even C’s cat because of C’s complaint that D had taken his car without his consent. 
The defence was that C had invented the threats to cover up, for the purpose of an 
insurance claim, the fact that he had consented to D taking the car. At trial, C was 
presented as a person of good character, while D’s convictions were revealed. When it 
later transpired that C had recent convictions for serious offences, the Court of Appeal 
quashed D’s conviction, saying that the case was “essentially a contest of credibility” and 
the contrast between the protagonists’ characters was clearly at the heart of that issue. 
To the same effect is Accamo68 where the prosecution had failed to disclose a witness’s 
 
62 [2016] EWCA Crim 1559. 
63 See also FSG&W [2013] EWCA Crim 84, in which there was uncontroverted evidence 
that V had been shot and the issue was whether he had overheard W requisitioning the 
weapon, but there was strong evidence confirming V’s account. Evidence of V’s bad 
character was rightly excluded.    
64 Ibid., at [77].  
65 Jackson & Summers, n.47 above, at p. 335. 
66 Redmayne, n.54 above at 291. See also Jackson & Summers, n.47 above, at 349: “it 
is the responsibility of the authorities to ensure that the defence have the opportunity to 
challenge witnesses who have made incriminating statements and whose evidence is 
decisive to the matter at issue”.  
67 [2012] EWCA Crim 2948. 
68 [2017] EWCA Crim 751. 
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convictions for fraud: “In a case which effectively turned on one man’s word against 
another, disclosure of the conviction to the jury would have cured any false impression 
they might have had and ensured in effect a level playing field”. 69 
 
 
(2) Substantial probative value  
 
The justification for this part of the test hinges on what is meant by ‘substantial’ in this 
context, and that requires a brief foray into the history of s.100 and its relationship with 
s.101.   
 
The Law Commission’s proposals on bad character included a general requirement for 
substantial probative value whether the evidence concerned a defendant or a non-
defendant.70 As it was not the only safeguard, ‘substantial’ was intended to connote only 
‘more than trivial’.71 The proposal did not stay the legislative course. While s.100 fitted 
in well with the thinking of the government of the day,72 the basic threshold for 
prosecution applications to introduce a defendant’s bad character under s.101(1)(d) was 
reduced to one of simple relevance, supplemented by an exclusionary discretion under 
s.101(3). Tapper pointed out that the stringent common law rules protecting the 
defendant could be said to have changed places with the over-inclusive rules for non-
defendants, so that we now have “different but converse tests”.73 Substantial probative 
value survives in s.101 only for applications made by one co-defendant against another 
under s.101(1)(e).  
 
The imposition of a higher threshold for admissibility of the bad character of non-
defendants and co-defendants appears incongruous and poses challenges of 
interpretation.74  The courts’ preferred way to make sense of the overall structure has 
been to stress the importance of the discretion in relation to prosecution applications to 
admit a defendant’s bad character under s.101(1)(d), and to make a contrast with 
s.101(1)(e) under which there is a higher threshold for admissibility but no discretion. 
This has had implications for the meaning of ‘substantial’ in s.101(1)(e), with knock-on 
implications for s.100 as the courts have, understandably, read the expression as having 
the same meaning in both provisions.75 The issue, as identified by Pitchford LJ in 
Phillips76 is that the weaker meaning of ‘more than trivial’  runs the risk of “diluting the 
statutory threshold”. Instead, ‘substantial’ must be read “to ensure so far as possible 
that the probative strength of the evidence removes the risk of unfair prejudice”.77 This 
has more to commend it where the court is struggling to read s.101 as a coherent whole 
in the commonly-occurring situation where one co-accused seeks to adduce evidence of 
another’s guilt than it does in relation to s.100, where the function of the evidence is 
generally to undermine a prosecution witness’s credibility and where it can strongly be 
argued that the (intended) weaker meaning is the right one. If the evidence is of more 
than minimal significance in a case such as Docherty or Accamo where credibility has 
 
69 Ibid., at [34]. The convictions were in another name and had gone unnoticed. 
70 Except where the evidence had to do with the offence or the investigation or 
prosecution of it, or where there was agreement, or the defendant sought to adduce his 
own bad character. Law Com 273, Part XVIII.  
71 See, in relation to non-defendants, Law Com 273 at 9.36. 
72 There was strong support for an end to “defendants … dragging up long forgotten and 
barely relevant convictions in an attempt to unfairly undermine the credibility of 
prosecution witnesses.” White Paper, Justice for All, Cm. 5563 (Home Office, Lord 
Chancellor's Department and Office of the Attorney-General, 2002). 
73 Op. cit n.22 above at 544. 
74 Acknowledged in Weir [2006] 1 WLR 1885, [2005] EWCA Crim 2866 at [36]. 
75 Ibid. at [38]; Braithwaite n.58 above at [12].   
76 [2012] 1 Cr App R 25, [2011] EWCA Crim 2935. 
77 Ibid. at [40]. 
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been shown to be at the heart of the matter, what is the argument for requiring a 
greater degree of probative value?78 The weaker meaning was intended to ensure that 
s.100 would not exclude evidence that was necessary for a fair trial, in response to the 
problems that had befallen the rape shield provisions in A, 79 and this balance cannot be 
achieved if the probative value hurdle is set too high.  
  
The same desire for symmetry has stymied any argument that a discretion exists in 
respect of defence applications under s.100, because there is no such discretion under 
s.101(1)(e). So, although a discretion might have come in handy to deal with the 
problem of satellite issues, it is difficult to conjure one up consistently with the emerging 
narrative of how the converse tests fit together.      
 
 
(3) Credibility and Substantial Probative Value  
 
What sort of evidence is now regarded as having substantial probative value in relation 
to credibility? Where the defence case amounts to an assertion that a prosecution 
witness is lying, the accusation is a serious one: for most of us, perjury would be beyond 
the pale. As Saks and Spellman say, while all of us tell at least white lies:  
 
“… among all of us little liars is a relatively small number of really big liars. What 
the judge and jury need to learn is … whether [the witness] is someone who tells 
really big lies under really serious circumstances”.80  
 
Focusing for a moment on evidence of previous convictions rather than other forms of 
bad character evidence, s.100 was intended, as we have seen, to question the wisdom 
that convictions could help to identify a really big liar by undermining his general 
credibility, and to focus attention primarily on “evidence which suggests that the witness 
has an incentive to lie on this occasion”.81 This distinction figures in the authorities but 
without entirely eclipsing the old logic. Pitchford LJ in Brewster82 approved the comment 
of Professor Spencer83 that evidence of direct relevance to credibility is more likely to be 
admitted under s.100 than evidence showing only indirectly that he is a person whose 
word cannot be trusted, but concluded that evidence going to general credibility might 
still be received where the judge considers it could influence a “fair-minded” tribunal as 
to the worth of the witness’s evidence.84 So in Hussein,85 a case of rape where the 
defence was one of denial that intercourse had taken place, the complainant’s 
convictions for offences of violence, dishonesty and dangerous driving were so 
“numerous, varied and recent” that they should have been admitted “upon the issue of 
whether her accusation was worthy of belief”.86  
 
 
78  S [2007] 1 W.L.R. 63 and S v DPP [2006] EWHC 1207 (Admin) both stress the need 
to avoid a construction of s.100 that would risk conflict with Article 6.   
79 [2002] 1 AC 45, [2001] UKHL 25. 
80 Michael J. Saks & Barbara A. Spellman The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law 
(New York: New York University Press, 2016) p.171. 
81 Law Com 273 at 9.26. 
82 [2011] 1 WLR 601, [2010] EWCA Crim 1194 at [24]. 
83 John Spencer, Evidence of Bad Character 3rd ed (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
2016) at 3.14.   
84 [2011] 1 WLR 601, [2010] EWCA Crim 1194 at [21], referencing the pre-2003 case of 
Sweet-Escott (1971) 55 Cr App R 316, below n.99 and associated text. 
85 [2015] EWCA Crim 383. 
86 Contrast Garnham [2008] EWCA Crim 266, a case of rape where the issue was 
consent and the complainant’s old but substantial record for dishonesty was rightly 
excluded because it yielded no “evidence of dishonesty of the type that would assist the 
jury”.  
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Convictions for offences such as perjury, because they show willingness to tell exactly 
the sort of big lie in issue,87 might be considered particularly likely to pass the probative 
value threshold. Under s.100 the possible importance of such convictions has been 
acknowledged, but again without shutting the door on other evidence. In Stephenson88 
the complainant in a case of historic sexual abuse had cautions for theft and receiving 
and a conviction for the latter which the trial judge refused to admit because “dishonesty 
was not the same as untruthfulness”. Hughes LJ held that “it does not follow … that 
previous convictions which do not involve either the making of false statements or the 
giving of false evidence are incapable of having substantial probative value in relation to 
the credibility of a non-defendant under s.100.” The case was a typical credibility contest 
in that S was claiming that the complainant had made the whole thing up. Thus the 
judge should have assessed the probative value of the character evidence rather than 
simply discounting it. 
 
The courts could be said to be hedging their bets by allowing these different kinds of 
argument to succeed in relation to probative value where credibility is concerned but, 
while evidence of direct motivation to lie might be particularly helpful in resolving a 
credibility contest, it does not follow that courts or juries are necessarily wrong to pursue 
logic based on the persistence of more general character traits. Mike Redmayne’s review 
of the relevant psychological literature led him to favour working from a wider premise, 
at least as regards the connection between honesty and deviancy.89 The courts’ 
approach may be more inclusive than the Law Commission intended, but it does not 
exclude anything that might, on particular facts, be thought to have genuine significance 
in resolving a credibility contest. And, importantly, the flexibility it affords serves to 
counter the risk that the evidential threshold indicated by “substantial probative value” 
might be nudged too high by the need to achieve consistency with s.101(1)(e).  
 
 The inquiry into the relevance of bad character to credibility is in any case, as Hughes LJ 
observed in Braithwaite,90 “highly fact-sensitive”. It is difficult, for example, to stipulate 
in advance what kind of conviction might support a suggestion that that a non-defendant 
is minimising or covering up his part in the offence being tried. An offence of violence 
does not by itself indicate mendacity, but might be significant where, for example, the 
complainant claims to have been the innocent and passive recipient of a beating.91 It is 
not only a perjury conviction that might indicate that a non-defendant has a propensity 
to tell a big lie: such an inference might also be drawn where he has previously given 
demonstrably false evidence in support of a not guilty plea, whatever the charge. Indeed 
the non-defendant’s lie may not have been linked to a conviction at all, as where it is 
said that a complainant in a sexual case has told a really big lie in the form of a false 
allegation of a similar kind against a third party. So perhaps the best that can be 
achieved by way of a generalisation is to say, as the court did in Brewster, that s.100 
has removed the right unfairly to rely on “old, irrelevant or trivial” behaviour, or, as 
Professor Spencer says, that convictions that are “stale and/or relatively minor” are 
more likely to be discarded as having a bearing when credibility is in issue than the 
recent and/or serious.92 Each case should be viewed on its merits.93  
 
87 Cf s.101(1)(d) where the prosecution seeks to establish a “propensity for 
untruthfulness” on the part of the accused. 
88 [2006] EWCA Crim 2325. 
89 M. Redmayne, Character in the Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015) 
p.196 et seq.  
90 Above n.58 at [12] 
91 In Hodkinson [2015] EWCA Crim 1509, leave was obtained to adduce evidence of the 
violent disposition of a man whom H was said to have sexually assaulted, the argument 
being “if that sort of thing happened, surely you would have reacted in a violent way?”   
92 Spencer, n.83 above, at 3.16. 
93 The guidance on assessment of probative value in s.100(3) was drafted with an eye to 
evidence going to the issue rather than credibility, and makes no direct reference to the 
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The courts’ approach also recognises that the probative value of evidence may be 
affected by the existence of other proof already in play, as in Kelly94where the defence 
argued that a prosecution witness had made up the accused’s murder confession in 
order to wriggle out of a charge of fraud, but she had in her evidence admitted to the far 
more compelling incentive of avoiding being charged with the murder herself. Nothing 
about the fraud would have helped the jury to decide whether she was telling the truth. 
By contrast, in RA95 it was held that RA should have been permitted to demonstrate the 
complainant’s possible motivation to fabricate a sexual assault by showing that RA had 
previously exposed his ex-wife, the complainant’s sister, as a violent abuser. Although 
the bad character in question was not even that of the complainant, it provided some 
answer to the prosecution’s contention that she had no reason to lie. 
 
Any discussion of the probative value of bad character would be incomplete without 
acknowledging the deeply unflattering things that psychology has to say about humans 
as lie-detectors. Tossing a coin would be almost as likely to produce the right answer. 
Many lies are simply undetectable.96 Further, the more confident the decider, the less 
accurate the decision is likely to be.97 In this very uncertain landscape, the moderately 
restraining influence of s.100 can still be said to make sense. Even those who have given 
up on the jury as engines for the discovery of truth and who regard them simply as 
moral tie-breakers would still accept that their deliberations should not be informed by 
false stereotypes and unwarranted assumptions about character.98  
 
 
Cross-examination that packs a punch with no evidential value  
 
Section 100 can also be seen as part of a wider movement in which judicial control is 
brought to bear on techniques of advocacy that have little to do with any concept of 
probative value, substantial or otherwise. 
 
Well before s.100, Lawton J in Sweet-Escott had famously deprecated the conduct of 
advocates who simply “delve into a man's past and … drag up such dirt as they can find 
there”,99 and advocated the approach now sanctioned in Brewster, confining the inquiry 
to matters that would affect a fair-minded fact-finder.100 The difficulty lay in finding a 
workable control mechanism, and casting s.100 as an exclusionary rule means that 
space must be made for considering admissibility in advance of trial.101 Lord Justice Auld, 
in his Review of the Criminal Courts102 observed that the problem for the trial judge in 
restraining the cross-examiner (on any matter, not simply bad character evidence) lay in 
getting a clear enough overview of the impact of intervention on the overall fairness of 
the trial, when intervention in open court risks compromising the appearance of judicial 
 
matter of motivation to lie (which would have been helpful). It assists only to the extent 
that the court is required to consider the nature and number of events to which the bad 
character evidence relates, when the events occurred and (where it is suggested that the 
probative value derives from similarity) the nature and extent of any alleged similarities.  
94 [2015] EWCA Crim 817. 
95 [2017] EWCA Crim 1515. 
96 See e.g Bond & B de Paulo “Accuracy of Deception Judgments” Personality & Social 
Psychology Review Vol 10 issue 3 pp.214-234 (2006).  
97 M. Green, “The Elephant in the Room’ [2004] E & P 28 at 32. 
98 See the discussion in a different context by T. Ward, “Expert Evidence and Credibility” 
[2009] E&P 83.  
99 (1971) 55 Cr App R 316. 
100 Above, n.82. 
101 Crim PR 21.3.  
102 Note 46 above at p.527.  
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neutrality.103 Whether the defence seeks the agreement of the prosecution to admit 
evidence of bad character, or asks leave of the court to do so, s.100 resolves the 
problem by putting the onus on the defence to identify the issue to which the evidence 
relates104 and to formulate an argument showing the value of the bad character evidence 
in resolving it. Judicial interventions at trial can therefore be kept to a minimum. Where 
the prosecution agrees the evidence, the judge should be informed105 in order to 
consider the timing and the manner in which the evidence will be put.  
 
 As Henderson has demonstrated,106 the purposes of a traditional cross-examination 
were not limited to – and sometimes not at all concerned with – drawing out evidence: 
rather, advocates used the process to convey to the jury a particular perception or 
narrative of events, in which “the witness is the medium but not necessarily the 
message”.107 Where the witness had convictions, these might be deployed to put the 
jury off the witness with scant regard for whether in any real sense the witness’s credit 
was diminished: it was more in the nature of a comment or an aside to the jury than an 
attempt to shed any real light on the issue of credibility. To create, as s.100 does, a 
framework within which the actual probative value of the evidence must be capable of 
being demonstrated in advance of trial is to shift the cross-examination away from such 
dramatic “forensic posturing”.108 To this extent s.100 is a more radical measure than at 
first sight appears: it sits alongside the common law development that Henderson has 
traced through the series of Court of Appeal decisions including Barker 109 whereby the 
cross-examination of children now “functions as a forensic examination – a test – the 
object of which is to obtain evidence of real value”110 and in which “[t]he purpose of the 
trial process is to identify the evidence which is reliable and that which is not, whether it 
comes from an adult or a child”.111  
 
This judge-led reassessment of what cross-examination is about is moving slowly but 
surely beyond its starting-point of vulnerable witnesses.112 Section 100, by depriving the 
cross-examiner of the opportunity for kite-flying and innuendo, may only be doing what 
the common law would eventually have achieved as part of this evidence-based 
approach. But by doing it decisively within a statutory framework it has led the way 
rather than needing to follow the trend.  Oversight of cross-examination is an important 
illustration of the judicial control necessary for the optimisation model to run 
smoothly,113 and optimisation will not be achieved all the while comment dressed as 
evidence is permitted.  
 
103 See also the Leveson Review, n.42 above at para 257. The observation concerns the 
evidence of children, but the recommendation for curtailing unnecessary evidence and 
prolix, irrelevant or oppressive questioning that follows is widely drawn. 
104 “Neither the prosecution nor a court can properly decide whether the character of a 
witness is admissible unless the issues in the case are identified.” CPS 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/rape-and-sexual-offences-chapter-14-bad-
character accessed June 2019. 
105 J(DC) [2010] 2 Cr App R 2; [2010] EWCA Crim 385 at [21].  
106 E Henderson, “All the Proper Protections – the Court of Appeal rewrites the rules for 
the cross-examination of vulnerable witnesses” [2014] Crim LR 93. 
107 Ibid at 97. 
108 The phrase is Lord Judge’s, in the context of cross-examination of children, though he 
deprecated such conduct more generally: “The Evidence of Child Victims: The Next 
Stage” Bar Council Annual Law Reform Lecture 21st November 2013.  
109[2010] EWCA Crim 4.  
110 Henderson op. cit. n.103 at p.102. 
111 Ibid, at p.103 
112 See e.g. Farooqi [2013] EWCA Crim 1649 involving terrorist offences, where the 
Court of Appeal also deprecated ‘the increasing habit of comment or assertion … in 
cross-examination.  
113 Jackson and Summers n.47 above at p.367. 
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The success of s.100 does depend on the quality of advocacy and on the observance not 
only of the letter but also the spirit of the Criminal Procedure Rules,114 so it is cause for 
concern that Sir Bill Jeffrey, in his review, was struck by “how hand to mouth the system 
seemed …  and by how often it appeared to throw up an under-prepared advocate, 
particularly at the pre-trial stages”.115 A more recent survey highlights judges’ concern 
that some advocates lack a sense of “realism of what the case is really about”116 - a key 
ingredient in the analysis for the purposes of a s.100 application117. Not all defence 
advocates fully appreciate their pre-trial role: “The need to contribute to the effective 
case management of the proceedings did not feature very large, I think, in most criminal 
advocates’ minds as part of their duties as an advocate”.118 The optimisation model 
depends the realisation of a “participatory ‘dialectic’ theory” that Jackson and Summers 
concede is seldom realised where pre-trial procedure is concerned.119 At the risk of 
stating the obvious, s.100 is dependent on a strong and effective pre-trial stage if it is to 
work as intended.  
 
‘Mere’ allegations of bad character under s.100 
 
In Bovell,120 an early decision of the Court of Appeal, it was doubted whether “the mere 
making of an allegation” could ever be admitted in evidence for the purposes of s.100. 
B’s defence at his trial for wounding N with intent was self-defence, and a key issue was 
where the knife came from. After B’s conviction it emerged that N had himself been 
charged with wounding three years previously, but the charge had been withdrawn amid 
concerns about the credibility of the complainant. The Court of Appeal thought it “highly 
unlikely” that the judge would have admitted this evidence had it been tendered at trial, 
citing in particular the investigation that would have been necessary in order to decide 
whether N was guilty of the offence, and the satellite issues that would have arisen in 
consequence.  
 
“Highly unlikely” is not, of course, the same as “never”, and the broad assertion in Bovell 
did not stand for long.121 The question under s.100 is whether there is evidence that 
satisfies the statutory threshold, not whether it comes in the form of an allegation or 
raises satellite issues in its wake. A conviction may be the most frequent and least 
controvertible form in which character evidence is adduced, but as the meaning of ‘bad 
character’ embraces misconduct in the form of the ‘commission of an offence or other 
reprehensible behaviour’122, there is nothing to prevent the defence adducing evidence of 
commission in some other form such as an admission: indeed cautions are frequently 
 
114 S [2009]EWCA Crim 2457 at [13]. 
115 Independent criminal advocacy in England and Wales: A Review by Sir Bill Jeffrey 
(2014)https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/310712/jeffrey-review-criminal-advocacy.pdf accessed June 2019.  
116 J. Hunter, J. Jacobson A. Kirby, Judicial Perceptions of the Quality of Criminal 
Advocacy (Report of research commissioned by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and 
the Bar Standards Board, Birkbeck 
(2018)).http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/22949/1/Judicial%20perceptions%20of%20criminal%2
0advocacy.pdf at p.11 accessed March 2019. 
117 Some s.100 applications may well be outwith the rules: cf. the recent acid comment 
of the Court of Appeal in Paine [2019] EWCA Crim 341 in response to counsel’s 
argument that the evidence he wished to adduce was regularly received in the Crown 
Court: “whether things happen regularly in the Crown Court does not assist us when it 
appears to diverge 180 degrees from the guidance given by this court.”    
118 Op. Cit n.116 at p.14.  
119 Op. cit n. 48 above at p.22.  
120 [2005] 2 Cr App R 27 (401).  
121  Edwards [2006] 1 WLR 1524 (dealing with s.101, but applying the same principles). 
122 CJA 2003, s.112(1). 
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adduced precisely because they are predicated on an admission by the cautioned 
party.123 Evidence may also be adduced in respect of other reprehensible behaviour, 
such as the making of a previous false complaint of sexual assault. A mere recital that 
an offence has been reported, such as may be contained in a CRIS report, does not 
constitute evidence of it, as Hughes LJ pointed out in Braithwaite,124 but evidence may 
come in many other forms, whether from another witness, from a hearsay statement 
falling within an exception to the rule, or even from the accused himself.125 
 
 Many cases fall at this evidential hurdle: allegations that a prosecution witness has 
made a previous false complaint frequently fail because there is insufficient evidence 
that the earlier complaint was untrue.126 The fact that a previous allegation led to an 
acquittal does not mean the accuser was lying,127 nor does the fact that the allegation 
was not proceeded with.128 So many applications have been doomed to fail on this score 
that the Court of Appeal has had to upbraid counsel for taking the point at all in the 
absence of supporting evidence of falsity.129  
 
 If there is evidence to support the allegation, however, the “draconian”130 provisions of 
s.109, under which a court is bound to assume the truth of evidence of bad character 
when making decisions about admissibility, come into play,131 and if the evidence then 
passes the twin tests of providing substantial probative value on an issue of substantial 
importance, it is admissible and its weight becomes a matter for the fact-finder to 
determine.   
 
Allegations, collateral finality and satellite issues  
 
The collateral finality rule exists “to confine the ambit of a trial within proper limits and 
to prevent the true issue becoming submerged in a welter of detail”.132 This is 
accomplished by denying the cross-examiner the opportunity to provide evidence in 
support of any matter advanced in cross-examination of a witness that was not a fact in 
issue or relevant to a fact in issue (typically, a matter going only to credibility) unless 
one of the exceptions to the rule applies. 
 
 
123 See e.g. J.R. Spencer, “Cautions as Character Evidence: a Reply to Judge Branston” 
[2015] Crim LR 611.   
124 Above, n.58. 
125 Luckett [2015] EWCA Crim 1050 at [25] “the fact that the only basis for these 
allegations against the complainant was the account given by the appellant himself 
should not, of itself, have been considered a reason for excluding this evidence.” Erwood 
[2016] EWCA Crim 839 rejecting D’s evidence of previous threats by V, appears to be 
based on a misreading of Braithwaite. 
126 See e.g Stephenson [2006] EWCA Crim 2325; V [2006] EWCA Crim 1901; Walsh 
[2012] EWCA Crim 2728; Al-Hilly [2014] 2 Cr App R 33, [2014] EWCA Crim 1614; T 
[2014] EWCA Crim 618; Abbas [2015] 2 Cr App R 11, [2015] EWHC 579(Admin). 
127 BD [2007] EWCA Crim 4. 
128 Rehman [2017] EWCA Crim 106, in which there had been a plea to a lesser offence; 
Shah [2015] EWCA Crim 1250; Burchell [2016] EWCA Crim 1559; Clarke [2016] EWCA 
Crim 2030. 
129 Ali [2017] EWCA Crim 1211. In sexual cases the matter is of particular importance as 
in the absence of evidence of falsity the application may be an attempt to circumvent 
s.41 YJCEA 1991.  
130 The expression is Tapper’s, op. cit n.22 above.  
131 Braithwaite n.58 above at [17]; S [2009] EWCA Crim 2457 at 42.  
132 Edwards [1991] 1 WLR 207 at p.215 per Lord Lane CJ. 
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 It would have been (just) possible to construe s.100 as operating in combination with 
the finality rule133 but the accepted construction is that it does not. In Phillips134 Pitchford 
LJ considered the true rule to be that “if the statutory test is met, not only may the 
witness be cross-examined but evidence may be led to prove the bad character 
alleged.”135 This shift, it was acknowledged, has the “capacity to change the landscape of 
a trial”136 in terms of permitting satellite litigation.  
 
This is a good thing to the extent that the finality rule, as Keane has demonstrated,137 is 
capable of perpetrating injustice, not just because the distinction between evidence 
going to an issue and to credibility may sometimes be thin, but because of the 
underlying assumption that credibility is not, at the end of the day, as important as other 
matters. If the whole case is essentially a credibility contest, the rule is an obstacle to 
fair trial. It also goes against the principle of optimisation – better to allow potentially 
influential evidence to emerge and be challenged than to conceal it with a negative rule 
of admissibility. Evidence that might well have been excluded under the pre-2003 law 
was received in McGuffie138where the defence case focused on police observation logs 
which appeared to have been doctored. What was not argued, because it had not been 
disclosed, was that in a parallel case involving the same officers the accuracy of their 
observation logs had been criticised by a judge, as a result of which the officers were the 
subject of an investigation. The Court of Appeal held that, had the matters been 
disclosed, s.100 would have allowed them to be explored at M’s trial, and M’s conviction 
was quashed. 
 
It is not such a good thing if the upshot is that the court has no control over the extent 
to which a satellite issues is litigated. As Keane notes, there are cases where the 
evidence “can be given in minutes, not hours”, and where it relates to “ a simple and 
distinct issue that would hardly confuse the jury”.139 But the converse is also possible: 
even once the statutory threshold has been surmounted, a can of worms might be 
opened which threatens not only the efficiency of the trial,140 but also its fairness.  
 
The Leveson Review championed (not for the first time) a general discretion such as that 
contained in Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to exclude any evidence the 
probative value of which is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”141 The common law 
traditionally opposes any power of this sort that can be exercised against the defence, 
but if all parties are to share responsibility for keeping the trial focused on resolving the 
real issues, it is hard to see why the defence should be able to insist on an inquiry that 
carries with it the risk of undue distraction and confusion.142  
 
133 Braithwaite at [22], “in theory at least”.  
134 [2012] 1 Cr App R 25.   
135 Phillips [2012] 1 Cr.App.R 25. The decision concerns s.101(1)(e) but applies equally 
to s.100: see [38].  
136 Ibid at [40].  
137 A.Keane, ‘The collateral evidence rule: a sad forensic fable involving a circus, its 
sideshow, confusion, vanishing tricks and alchemy.’ [2015] E&P 100. 
138 [2015] EWCA Crim 307. See under the old law Edwards [2006] 1 WLR 1524 and 
R.Pattenden “Evidence of Previous Malpractice by Police Witnesses and R v Edwards” 
[1992] Crim LR 549. 
139 Op.cit n.136 above at 109. 
140 “[I]t is a truism that satellite issues are often inimical to efficient trial”, per Lord Kerr 
in Mitchell [2016] UKSC 55 at [53]. 
141 Leveson, n.41 above at para 262. 
142 C.Callen “Human Deliberation in Fact-Finding and Human Rights in the Law of 
Evidence” in Roberts & Hunter (eds) Criminal Evidence and Human Rights at 309 writes 
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In the absence of a general discretion there is something of a lacuna because s. 100, as 
has already been observed, does not come with any specific power to exclude.143 In 
some cases, satellite litigation may be avoided by agreeing or admitting facts relating to 
an allegation about a non-defendant, but this is of no help if its truth is not accepted.144 
In other cases, it may be possible to take the contextual approach to substantial 
probative value by holding that evidence already in play renders the disputed allegation 
otiose; if convictions have already been admitted, a contested allegation may add 
nothing of substance.145   
 
In some cases the concept of ‘substantial probative value’ is sometimes stretched to 
provide, in effect, a vehicle for exercising the missing discretion. In Phillips the court 
doubted whether the proliferation of satellite issues had been contemplated in the 
drafting of s.101(1)(e), and hoped to limit the effects by rejecting a low threshold for 
‘substantial’, while incorporating the notion of ‘avoiding unfair prejudice’ to the co-
accused against whom the evidence is proffered. In similar vein in Dizaei 146 Lord Judge 
CJ considered that the statutory threshold for s.100 might be held not to have been 
reached if the emergence of satellite issues might diminish the jury’s grasp of the case 
as a whole. This may take us to where we need to be in cases where satellite litigation 
ought to be avoided, but it seems hard to reconcile with s.109, under which reference to 
the probative value of evidence is a reference to its probative value on the assumption 
that it is true, which does not appear to make allowance for the proliferation of issues 
that might arise on the way to proving it.      
 
One option that is clearly open to the court where an allegation that raises satellite 
issues is supported only by hearsay evidence concerns the power to exclude such 
evidence in s.126 of the 2003 Act. This may be exercised where “the case for excluding 
the statement, taking account of the danger that to admit it would result in undue waste 
of time, substantially outweighs the case for admitting it, taking account of the value of 
the evidence.” The power applies to defence evidence,147 and while it seems odd that 
such a power exists in respect of hearsay evidence of bad character, but not bad 
character evidence simpliciter, the dental health of the gift horse thus provided should 
not be subject to undue scrutiny.   
 
An alternative, but one that has not so far commended itself, is to have regard to that 
part of s.100 that requires the leave of the court. It has so far been assumed that leave 
will be given wherever the statutory criteria are satisfied, but this does not necessarily 
follow. Section 101(1)(e), the provision regarding evidence on behalf of the co-accused 
 
of the importance of paying due regard to constraints on the ability of the adjudicator to 
process and evaluate information.  
143 Clear authorities against the existence of a discretion include Brewster [2011] 1 WLR 
601; Braithwaite n. 58 above and Dizaei [2013] 2 WLR 2257, [2013] EWCA Crim 88 per 
Lord Judge CJ at [35]. In Carr [2008] EWCA Crim 1283 Dyson LJ referred to a judge 
exercising a discretion whether to admit evidence under s.100 but in S [2009] EWCA 
Crim 2457 it was said to be a matter of judgment not discretion.   
144 Braithwaite n.58 at [21]: “Of course if there are agreed facts which can be presented 
to a jury they should be … so that a ‘mini a trial within a trial’ is avoided.” See also 
Rehman [2017] EWCA Crim 106 at [54] where the court accepted “a degree of satellite 
litigation may well have been inevitable”, and AB [2016] EWCA Crim 1849 where the 
prosecution went as far as it could in stating that the background to the case appeared 
to lie in an “alleged” assault by the victim.  
145 Braithwaite n.58 above at [12]: “it may in some cases be appropriate to consider 
whether it adds significantly to other more probative evidence directed to the same 
issue.”    
146 [2013] 2 WLR 2257; [2013] EWCA Crim 88 at [38]. 
147 Drinkwater [2016] 1 Cr App R 471 (30). 
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that has been so influential in moulding the understanding of s.100, does not have a 
leave requirement,148 so it would be a possibility to develop s.100 in a slightly different 
direction using the leave requirement as a lever.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Section 100 fits well with the modern concept of fair trial, and with other moves towards 
controlling inappropriate cross-examination. Witnesses should not be confronted by 
evidence of their bad character that adds little or nothing to the case, nor should juries 
be expected to sit through it. Although a rule of exclusion, s.100 has not been deployed 
so as to deny the defence the right to adduce evidence that might have some value in a 
case where the witness’s credibility really matters, and if it has a flaw it is that it needs a 
specific mechanism to prevent distracting satellite litigation. In the short-term it seems 
the courts have been able to make do, or borrow such a power, but whether these 
strategies are to be preferred to the express recognition of a discretion to exclude 
defence evidence is a question that may eventually have to be confronted.    
 
 
 
148 Leave would have been necessary under the Law Commission’s recommendations 
taken effect, but the resultant asymmetry could now be construed as another gift horse. 
